This article explores whether the presumption of innocence is compromised by State declarations that a person is other than innocent, but which are neither predicated on nor equivalent to a criminal conviction. The task ultimately is threefold: in a descriptive sense, to establish the existing parameters of the presumption, in particular tracing its incremental expansion by the European Court of Human Rights; secondly, to present a normative argument as to what I believe the presumption should further entail, drawing on its recent doctrinal extension but moving beyond this in certain respects; and then finally to ascertain whether any labels or declarations by the State either before or absent a finding of criminal liability are problematic as regards the presumption of innocence as I propose it should be construed, and what ought to be done about this.
I. Introduction
The conventional, contemporary understanding of the presumption of innocence as a principle of criminal law and procedure is that it embodies two elements, firstly prescribing that the State must bear the burden of proof in a criminal trial and secondly requiring that the guilt of the individual as regards a particular crime be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Such a construction generally is uncontroversial in common law legal doctrine and scholarship. Now, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 2 has extended this central protective notion to preclude expressions of suspicion by the courts after acquittal and also declarations of guilt by agents of the State prior to trial.
Moreover, a brief reference by the European Court of Human Rights seems to intimate that the presumption of innocence may go further still, and perhaps may apply to other stigmatising actions by the State. 2 Various existing state practices, such as criminal accusation and prosecution, inclusion on 'watch lists', and publication of details of civil preventative orders, may be hard to reconcile with an expansive version of the presumption of innocence, on the basis that they involve the treatment as other than innocent of persons who have not been found to be criminally culpable. While it may first appear that these engage the presumption of innocence as defined in the European context, according to Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) the presumption cannot apply unless and until the individual is charged, thereby excluding some actions from its scope. 3 Nonetheless, intuitively it seems that certain official actions and statements do not comport with the ethos underpinning the presumption, which includes protecting the individual against the coercive power of the State. 4 This article begins in section II by examining the steady extension of the reach of the presumption of innocence in the context of ECHR jurisprudence. Though we all may agree on the conventional core of the presumption and the reasons for its protection in the context of criminal procedure, in section III I posit and defend a new and broader reading premised on protecting the individual from State censure. Even under the wide-ranging European approach, the presumption does not accrue until an individual is charged with an offence; I propose an extension so as to protect individuals who are subject to State labelling but who have not been charged.
While there is a rich literature on official treatment of the individual that ostensibly breaches the presumption of innocence, such as pre-trial detention, 5 that is not the concern of this paper. My focus is narrower: here the emphasis is on official, 4 of fact-finding, objectives that also underpin the aspect of the presumption that places the burden on the State. 10 Though a high standard of proof does not prescribe precisely how people should be treated, a primary reason for this second element of the presumption is to guard against illegitimate convictions, given that the condemnation and punishment of an innocent person is deemed to cause more harm than the avoidance of liability by a guilty person. Essentially, this aspect of the presumption of innocence seeks to reduce the likelihood and potential cost of error as regards wrongful conviction in the criminal trial.
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In the United States the presumption of innocence is read into the FirthFifth Amendment to the Constitution, and has been described not as a presumption 'in the strict sense of the term [but]… simply a rule of evidence which allows the defendant to stand mute at trial and places the burden upon the government to prove the charges against him beyond reasonable doubt.' 12 The presumption does not apply to pre-trial proceedings in the US, but rather it 'allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of suspicions.' 13 The presumption thereby places the onus on the State to prove a case and ultimately is addressed to the finder of fact, whether that is the jury or a professional judge.
Such a narrow reading forms the relatively uncontroversial heart of the presumption across common law jurisdictions, but more expansive procedural understandings have been posited, mostly in academic literature, but now also by the European Court of Human Rights. Overall, the key interpretive question regarding the presumption concerns the stage of the process at which it applies, because this indicates the persons to whom it accrues and the State agents it binds. As Ashworth notes, its scope and meaning are 'eminently contestable' given that it may operate at the level of the 10 Ibid. 11 Though the acquittal of the factually innocent is also an error, the aim is not to reduce the aggregate errors, so to speak, but to achieve overall a distribution of errors that favours the acquittal of the factually guilty over the conviction of the innocent, based on the normative conclusion that the former is less problematic than the latter. criminal trial only or in the criminal process more broadly. 14 In its conventional and least challenged form, the presumption is a procedural safeguard relevant only at trial, guarding against conviction if the prosecution has not proved the alleged offence to the requisite standard. Thus, it has no applicability before the criminal trial commences. At the opposite end of the scale, it may be regarded as applying at the pre-trial stage more broadly and as prohibiting all restrictions on the accused's liberty based on a view that she has a high risk of offending or disappearing, 15 or as precluding coercive measures by the State against the individual. 16 Furthermore, and more contentiously, the presumption of innocence has been conceived of as substantive in nature, and as prohibiting conviction where the person's conduct is of the kind that ought not to be criminal.
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In ECHR jurisprudence, the presumption of innocence as a procedural rule is interpreted in an increasingly generous fashion, and, of course, any development in European doctrine has ramifications for the traditional conception of the presumption in England and Wales, given the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. 18 Article 6(2) of the ECHR provides that '[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law' and so a court 'should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused.' 19 Moreover, 'pretrial procedures should be conducted, so far as possible, as if the defendant were innocent'. 20 Beyond this, the European Court has found the presumption to encompass what has been called a 'reputational' aspect, which aims to protect the image of the person 21 but also to defend him against the power of the State. 22 The Lord PhillipsUK
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Supreme Court in the Supreme Court described this development as the expansion of a component of the guarantee of a fair trial into 'something coming close to a principle of the law of defamation', and regarded this as a 'remarkable' example of the Convention's nature as a 'living instrument'.
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As Trechsel observes, complex problems surround the application of this interpretation of the presumption of innocence. 24 Nevertheless, ECHR case law has delineated a number of rules in this respect. Article 6(2) will be breached by judicial decisions or reasoning reflecting an opinion that an unconvicted person is guilty, such as orders requiring him to pay the cost of criminal proceedings and compensation, or statements that had a prosecution not been time-barred it would 'very probably have led to … conviction'. 25 Moreover, the presumption is infringed where a court expresses suspicion about an acquitted individual (rather than opining that he is guilty), such as by refusing compensation to him or by saying that suspicion has not been 'dispelled'.
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Refusing to grant a cost order to a person who was acquitted after a key prosecution witness failed to show at trial was found to breach the presumption also. 27 Furthermore, Article 6(2) was deemed to be contravened by a confiscation order that included the benefit derived from all the offences with which the individual had been charged, even those of which he had been acquitted. 28 Where State agents describe a person as suspect, as problematic, as risky, or as criminal, an official view is being conveyed that separates her from the 'law-abiding' majority.
Such labels may be imposed through criminal accusation and prosecution, by means of inclusion on 'watch lists', or through the publication of details of civil preventative orders like anti-social behaviour orders, for example. Though public preconceptions about individuals who come in contact with the justice system may be unavoidable, as Husak has said 'it is one thing to have such feelings, and quite another to express them through an institution'.
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Some of these State practices suggest that we may need to reframe our perception of liability: rather than the dyad of culpability that is thought to attach to the criminal process, in fact there seems to be a continuum ranging from innocent through to guilt in relation to suspected criminal behaviour, with interim positions involving State expressions of suspicion and ascriptions of blame. This may imply that some of the traditional protections that relate to the criminal trial, strictly speaking, are valuable or necessary in a wider context. The presumption cannot, however, be engaged, still less breached, by such statements if we conceive of it as a purely procedural device that relates to the trial only. Thus, it may be necessary to justify a more expansive reading of the presumption than is accepted currently, in terms of its relevance beyond the criminal trial and so ultimately to expand the people who may avail of its protection. Furthermore, I must defend relying on it over alternative individual rights.
a. The purposes of the presumption
We are all likely to agree on the presumption's traditional scope and the reasons for its significance in the context of the criminal trial. While extending its protections outside of this setting by definition requires us to view the presumption as more than a procedural constraint, I argue that this remains in keeping with its purposes.
There are various rationales for the presumption, centring on the protection of the individual from the coercive power of the State and the avoidance of erroneous 12 convictions, through to policy concerns about maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 53 Dennis describes these as the presumption's epistemic and nonepistemic values: while the former dimension requires the prosecution to prove the allegation against the accused, the latter gives effect to a person's claim to fair treatment by the State and to the principle that a liberal polity should treat its citizens as lawabiding until it proves otherwise.
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Drawing on both the epistemic and non-epistemic dimensions of the presumption,
I suggest that its protections should apply to determinations of facts by the State in a manner that declares responsibility for criminal behaviour, even if this occurs outside the criminal trial. Epistemically, the uncontested core of the presumption in the criminal trial requires us to exercise caution as regards establishing evidence to a certain level of proof, due to the particular moral harm in a criminal conviction. 55 Here, the presumption guards against illegitimate conviction and the consequent punishment, which involves the imposition of deprivation or hard treatment on a person because he has committed a wrong in a way that expresses disapprobation for the conduct. 56 The former 'hard treatment' may take the shape of imprisonment, community service or a financial penalty.
The latter element, censure, is the expression of a judgment that a person has acted in a reprehensible manner and the attendant sentiment of disapproval; this reprobationary function distinguishes a tax from a fine. 57 Unlike denunciation, which concerns a particular act, censure is directed to the individual specifically and conveys to her that she has something to answer for in a moral way. 58 Given the implications for the rights of the individual, the presumption prevents the imposition of such hard treatment and censure, unless the prosecution proves guilt to the requisite high level. The potential consequences therefore influence both the placing of the burden and the requisite standard of proof, explaining why in civil cases a lesser standard suffices. As well as seeking to prevent wrongful convictions, the presumption as a procedural rule has non-epistemic importance. It is grounded in general values of political morality, 59 deriving from but also preserving and concretising the trust and respect between the State and its citizens. 60 Moreover, the presumption can be seen as part of what has been called the 'principle of civility', 61 demonstrating our commitment to a sense of community and respect for fellow members. 62 If we consider the trial process and criminal conviction as involving a communicative dimension, 63 then we can view the constituent rights as involving an expressive component, as well as serving deontological ends. In this way, we can consider the presumption as being directed at more than the immediate adjudicator, and as conveying to the citizenry that an individual may be depicted and censured openly as criminal only with proof to the requisite level.
Drawing from these insights, I wish to move beyond viewing the presumption as a procedural rule of the criminal trial on the one hand and a mere rhetorical aim on the other. Here, I argue that the presumption as a legal rule is relevant to State determinations about contested facts that speak to a person's criminal responsibility. The interests at the heart of my concern are those protected by the presumption in its traditional form:
namely trust in and respect for the person, and protection from the State. Here I seek to use these values to underpin my proposed mechanism in concrete terms, to permit the presumption to be used an analytical tool and also as a reminder of the appropriate standard of proof in processes of determinations about criminality, regardless of whether this happens outside of beyond the criminal trial. 68 The sociological connotation of the term, as used by Goffman in his eponymous book, consists of the relationship between an 'attribute and a stereotype', where the attribute is 'deeply discrediting' E. Goffman, Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) 3. A stigma 'constitutes a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity': thus it betrays an incongruity between the person's identity and his conception of this, and that which is encountered, understood or interpreted by the public. So, while a particular characteristic may be considered to be a stigma, in fact it is the label ascribed on the basis of the perception of that trait that forms the stigma. It goes without saying that a person's perception of a label is subjective, and may be determined by his personality, status or role in society. A person may feel stigmatised, but in fact this does not fit with Goffman's definition if society does not actually devalue or discredit the person. Accordingly, what constitutes a stigma is contingent on societal norms, geographical and temporal factors rather than on the person's subjective perception of the label only: it needs to involve 'social obloquy'. Also see B. It may be argued that extension beyond its traditional procedural parameters makes the presumption do too much, as it were, and thus risks diluting its potency. The danger of extending the presumption in the context of the criminal trial is that it may overshadow or supersede cognate rights like the right to silence, making it more likely that they could be balanced away. 71 Here I accept the need to restrain the presumption's scope in the context of the trial itself and do not call for it to encompass other dimensions of the right to a fair trial. The more pressing objection in the present context is that a broader interpretation may eclipse the normative value of the narrower procedural protection, 72 and turn the presumption into a 'vaporous euphemism for fairness in the administration of criminal justice'.
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Certainly, profligate use of the presumption as a nebulous aspiration or a policy directive 74 risks undermining its concrete protections in terms of criminal procedure.
Nonetheless, I suggest that the presumption is apposite both as an interpretive lens and a justiciable right in the context of expressions of suspicion by agents of the State regarding the individual, 75 and that this perspective need not compromise its core status as a procedural right. My suggested use is not to imply that the presumption necessarily is infringed by any such declarations but that it provides a valuable means of framing the debate about and highlighting potential problems with certain methods of crime control.
If we first grant its heuristic value, we can later move to consider whether the presumption as a legal safeguard beyond the criminal trial is breached and if so whether this could be remedied by amendment of the standard of proof. In this instance, the presumption can regulate the devising of legislation that involves the ascription of liability in a way that involves censure, and it also constitutes a justiciable right for the affected individuals who are labelled as criminal on the basis of the civil standard of proof. 75 Indeed, some would argue that the proposed right in this paper should be as a renamed as a novel right or norm, rather than seeking to shoehorn it into the presumption of innocence. I continue to use the term, rather than adopting a reclassification, as the role and value of the presumption in the criminal process speaks to the objections I raise to certain State labels.
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The rights to privacy, to dignity and equality do similar work to the presumption in this context, and may seem more apposite given the concerns previously mentioned. It issi true that Article 8 also concerns the way the State engages with and treats its citizens, but focusing on the private life of the individual neglects the core problem with certain official statements that involve a particular public portrayal of the individual. 76 Only the presumption captures the essence of this particular wrong against the person and the expression of the statement that depicts a person in a certain manner. Similarly, the right to equality remains focused on consequences rather than on expression. 77 In essence what is advocated here is the applicability of the presumption when the individual is liable to be described in a censuring way by the State. Relying on the presumption in this way shines a light on the core of the wrong, and in turn pushes us towards an appropriate standard of proof.
b. The scope of the presumption
As a matter of doctrine, an individual cannot enjoy the protection of the presumption in the European context if shehe has not been charged; Article 6(2) is explicit about this. there is an official expression of belief regarding criminal propensity. It will be posited that while both types of label may be dubious broadly speaking, only the latter engages the presumption of innocence as it is construed here. Next, the paper considers situations where the State declares a view about the person which encourages the public to believe him her to be equivalent to a criminal, but where this occurs in the civil context rather than being predicated on an assessment of the facts by a criminal court. It will be argued that such practices engage the presumption, and require reliance on more than the civil standard of proof.
a. Expressions of suspicion
Where a person is arrested or charged, where he she is searched, detained and accused, and where information relating to him her is retained after such State intervention, he she has been distinguished in a certain way and thus is not being treated as innocent. smoke without fire, so to speak. 94 While Lord Rodger in the Supreme Court asserted that the public is 'more than capable of drawing the distinction between mere suspicion and sufficient evidence to prove guilt', 95 this seems to ascribe an undue degree of subtlety and thoughtfulness to popular discourse on suspects and crime, especially given the nature and tenor of some media coverage. 96 It is plausible that a significant proportion of the public extrapolates that arrest is a likely judgment of guilt.
Nevertheless, while the experience surrounding arrest can be unpleasant, undoubtedly is coercive, and may be associated with community stigma, such official treatment does not constitute punishment for a given act, nor is a person's guilt being determined. Public belief or distrust is not sufficient for the presumption to be engaged, even if this is prompted by State intervention. What is critical in this respect is that which is being generated or expressed in an official way. At this juncture the State and its agents, namely the police and prosecutors, articulate suspicion about criminality, but are not expressing belief regarding criminal liability in such a way as to induce public belief of guilt, nor do such actions constitute a 'prejudging' of the facts, to use the language of the European court.
Moreover, though pre-trial publicity may in fact impinge on the right to privacy of a person, it cannot be seen as dubious in terms of the presumption of innocence, even in the broader sense advocated in this paper. As Antony Duff has said, to summon a defendant to trial is to address and treat him her as a fellow citizen. 97 Arrest and then criminal charge begins a process where the State calls someone to account in relation to an alleged past act and treats him her as a rational member of the polity, but does not give 94 Moreover, the very fact of arrest may lead to discrimination: individuals accused but acquitted of assault have almost as much trouble finding an unskilled job as those convicted of the same offense. R. 
b. Stigmatising expressions regarding criminal propensity
The next type of labels may be regarded as encompassing the State's belief about a person's potential behaviour. The retention of DNA, the use of enhanced criminal records checks, and the creation of 'watch lists' treat the individual as less than innocent in a way that may sometimes be stigmatising, but it is questionable as to whether these constitute declarations of guilt as such. Thus, while the presumption may shed light in analysing these measures, it is less clear whether it is breached.
As regards the retention of DNA in databases, the applicants in S and Marper claimed that this cast suspicion on unconvicted persons and implied that they were not 'wholly innocent'. 98 In contrast to the Court of Appeal, which asserted that a police 98 S and Marper [89] .
constable could destroy DNA evidence if the person were free from 'any taint of suspicion', 99 the European Court expressed its concern that unconvicted persons, who 'are entitled to the presumption of innocence, are treated in the same way as convicted persons'. 100 The treatment of these distinct cohorts in an equivalent manner does not imply a view as to factual or legal guilt of those yet to be convicted but encapsulates the State's opinion of such persons as more risky than the rest of the population. The State is not judging guilt but rather speculating as to propensity; moreover, there is no publicity of the fact of retention, and genetic material usually is stored in code form that may be read with expertise only. 101 Thus any stigma is felt in a subjective manner only, and there is no cultivation of community condemnation. So, while a person whose DNA is retained rightly may feel singled out as not 'wholly innocent', the State is expressing concern about risk rather than declaring guilt, and given that inclusion is not publicised, the State's action does not encourage the public to view him her in a particular manner. This suggests that a DNA database including unconvicted individuals does not compromise the presumption of innocence.
Of course, as well as retaining DNA in limited instances, the police keep arrest records more generally, on the basis that a previous arrest might provide a lead to solving a current case. 102 The reasons a person was arrested but not prosecuted may range from a lack of evidence, through non-cooperation of witnesses to the person's intimidation of such witnesses, the fact that the arrest was grounded on harassment or other improper police conduct, and so on. 103 There is a qualitative difference between these cases, yet all lead to the same result, that is, the creation of a criminal record. Though such a record appears to characterise the individual in a certain light and depict him as less than dismissed, with argument centring on Article 8; thus the key element was the proportionality of the checks made into the accusations. 109 The Court held that the applicant should be given opportunity to make representations, not in all cases, but where there is room for doubt as to whether information that is considered to be relevant should be disclosed. 
c. Declarations of guilt regarding criminality
The next category to be explored in this typology involves public labelling by agents of the State, which expresses a view on the person's criminality in general rather than responsibility for a particular act. I suggest that the presumption is germane here given that the civil standard of proof. Nonetheless, I argue that these issues are not irremediable, as
given that the altering of the standard of proof and requiring anonymity maywould provide sufficient protection for the individual involved.
Across the UK, a court may make a civil anti-social behaviour order (an ASBO)
restricting the actions of a person who has been found responsible for anti-social behaviour, namely that which caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. 122 where ASBOs had been issued by the police and the local authority to a group of youths. Notice of these ASBOs was published in the press and on the authority's website (which referred to them as 'thugs' and 'bully boys', and mentioned their 'animalistic' behaviour), and flyers with photos and personal details of the boys were circulated. The leaflet spoke of 'keeping crime off the streets', and stated that the claimants were part of a group that had committed identified offences.
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The applicants sought judicial review of the decision to publicise the imposition of these unlawful conduct. 134 The civil standard of proof is used here. It is not necessary for proceedings to have been brought for an offence in connection with the property, 135 and property need not be related to a particular crime on the basis that this would make the scheme 'useless and unworkable'. 136 In other words, there is no predicate offence.
Indeed, the very rationale is to facilitate recovery of assets where a conviction and thus criminal confiscation is not possible, because of circumstances such as lack of evidence.
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Domestic and European courts have found that such recovery of assets on the civil standard of proof is not a criminal matter attracting due process protections. 138 In one respect, civil recovery may be viewed as preventative, as it ensures that illegal profits cannot be accumulated and used to fund criminality or corrupt democratic institutions.
Another interpretation is that it seeks to redress an imbalance by seizing assets accrued as a result of criminal activity and therefore is reparative. 139 I suggest that while the ostensible rationale is to recoup unlawfully acquired assets, and while these orders are directed at the property rather than the person, recovery also incorporates a substantial stigma 140 and incorporates the blame that distinguishes criminal from civil measures, with the former connoting 'should not do'. 141 Certainly, moral responsibility and social blame accrue as a result of judicial determination that property represents the proceeds of 33 crime. 142 Civil recovery in fact places the label of criminal on a person without due process protections: while the legislation refers to unlawful conduct, the assets seized are described as the 'proceeds of crime', both in relevant legislation and by the courts. This represents a declaration that encourages the public to believe the owner of the property to be guilty of criminality, broadly speaking.
Civil asset forfeiture often follows acquittal, but the argument that the presumption of innocence thereby is breached has been raised unsuccessfully in the UK that averments relating to a recovery order stated he was involved in the supply of controlled drugs although he had been acquitted of those charges. 145 The Court of Session rejected his line of argument, stressing that recovery and criminal proceedings are entirely separate, and that the averments did not invite or assert a finding of guilt of a particular offence, but rather contended that the conduct was unlawful. 146 This was found not to offend Article 6(2).
As previously noted, the European Court has stressed that Article 6(2) seeks to undermine the acquittal. 147 Viewing these cases in light of the presumption more broadly illuminates the State's declaration of guilt in a way as to shape public opinion, regardless of the conclusion of the criminal courts, or indeed whether a trial will occur at all. While the State's response would be that the aim is to remove funds after the perpetration of unlawful acts is established, the dissemination of a condemnatory opinion engages the presumption of innocence. So, rather than the reliance on evidence from an acquittal being problematic, I suggest that what is contentious here is the State declaration of guilt through the seizing of assets described as the proceeds of crime, but without proof beyond reasonable doubt. While the coercive tactic of seizing property itself is not unproblematic, the troubling issue in the context of this paper is the label and the publicity involved.
Here the State is depicting a members of the polity to his her fellow citizens as enjoying property generated through criminal behaviour. Given that the nuances of the standard of proof may be lost on the average person, the declaration is that the person is responsible for criminal acts. The policy implications of this insight are that in the context of asset forfeiture a higher standard of proof should be required, as occurs in relation to ASBOs. Having said this, the absence of hard treatment in the form of punishment per se implies that a 'clear and convincing' would suffice, rather than necessitating proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the implications for the individual indicate that perhaps anonymity should be preserved.
V. Conclusion
Labels in the criminal justice system have a declaratory function; offences thus need to be named and classified appropriately. 
